来源：《华盛顿邮报》
刊登日期：2021年5月28日
Epic Games sued Apple after its blockbuster video game “Fortnite” was exiled from the iOS app store for including an alternative payment option to bypass the 30 percent commission Apple customarily takes on sales. By breaking the highly controversial rules, Epic achieved the double opportunity to take Apple to the court of law as well as the court of public opinion. Winning the legal case was always going to be difficult given this country’s competition law — but this fight has always been about something bigger.
Epic公司在其热门视频游戏《堡垒之夜》被逐出iOS应用商店后起诉了苹果，原因是该游戏包含了一种替代支付方式，绕过了苹果通常收取的30%佣金。通过打破苹果备受争议的佣金规则，Epic获得了将苹果送上法庭和舆论法庭的双重机会。考虑到美国的竞争法，打赢这场官司很困难——但这场官司事关更大的事情。
Establishing that Apple is a monopoly is essential to Epic’s argument, and indeed attorneys and witnesses argued for days over defining the relevant market: the very wide world of game distribution, or the much smaller realm of iOS app distribution, in which Apple is the only contender? Even if Epic prevails there, it must further establish that Apple is abusing whatever monopoly it has. Epic says that’s happening in two ways: Apple is forcing developers to use the app store rather than allowing users to “sideload” apps onto their phones through other services, and it is forcing developers to use its payment processing system complete with that 30 percent cut.
在Epic的论点中，明确苹果是一个垄断者至关重要，事实上，律师和证人就相关市场的定义进行了数天的争论：是非常广泛的游戏分销领域，还是更小的iOS应用分销领域(苹果是其中唯一的竞争者)？即使Epic在这一点占据了上风，它也必须进一步证明苹果正在滥用其垄断地位。Epic表示，这主要通过两种方式实现：一是苹果迫使开发者使用iOS应用商店，而不是让用户通过其他服务将应用“下载”到自己的手机上；二是迫使开发者使用其支付处理系统，并从中获得30%的分成。
The second contention is more compelling. Apple has a good case that any anticompetitive effects of its grip over downloads are outweighed by the pro-consumer benefits of privacy and security it can ensure through careful software review. Apple has a much harder time explaining how it’s better for anyone except Apple that developers must either stomach the cost of a commission or give up in-app purchases entirely — especially when the products they are selling have little to do with the particular capabilities of the iPhone. Worse still, developers with scant name recognition have to hope that users will seek out their websites to subscribe or buy services, because Apple won’t even let them direct the consumers to the right place.
第二个论点更有说服力。苹果有一个很好的理由认为，其对下载的控制所产生的任何反竞争影响，都会被它通过仔细审查软件所能确保消费者的隐私和安全的正面作用所抵消。苹果很难解释，开发者必须要么承担佣金成本，要么完全放弃应用内置付费功能，这种状况为什么对除了苹果之外的所有人都更好——尤其是当开发者销售的产品与iPhone的特殊功能没有什么关系的时候。更糟糕的是，知名度不高的开发者不得不寄希望于用户会自己找到他们的网站来订阅或购买服务，因为苹果不允许开发者把用户引向正确的地方。
This case, in the end, is less about arguing over market definiton and percentage amounts than it is about the broader antitrust reckoning taking place today: What rules should apply to the companies that play the role of gatekeepers in the digital economy? What is fair dealing, and what is not? When does helping consumers justify harming competitors, and do some behaviors always do damage to both? U.S. District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers could deliver an answer on a narrow version of these matters by August, but Congress may soon develop its own theory of how Big Tech should be permitted to use its bigness.
最终，这个案件与其说是关于市场定义和份额的争论，不如说是关于目前正在发生的更广泛的反垄断清算：对于在数字经济中扮演守门人角色的公司，应该适用什么规则？什么是公平交易，什么不是？在什么情况下，帮助消费者是损害竞争对手的正当理由，而某些行为是否总是对双方都有损害？美国联邦地方法官罗杰斯可能会在8月之前就这些问题给出一个狭义的答案，但国会可能很快就会制定出自己的理论，即应该如何允许大型科技公司利用其规模。